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The Non-Executive Director of Australian Statutory
Authorities
Abstract
This paper is based on a review of the board composition of material Commonwealth
Statutory Authorities with particular focus on the profile of non-executive directors. The
analysis examines the mix of non-executive directors gender, remuneration, length of
board membership and the number of other directorships held and

The paper will review the roles of directors and outline a number of additional
requirements these directors have in comparison to directors of private sector
organisations and highlight the paradoxial requirement of independence. The paper
concludes questioning the need for independent directors (if there are any) on the boards
of Commonwealth Statutory Authorities.
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Introduction
The Australian Commonwealth Public Service has, like the private sector, increased
significantly its focus on the corporate governance arrangements of Government,
government departments, agencies and statutory authorities. Corporate governance can
be defined simply as the system by which organisations are directed, controlled and
managed (ASX 2003; O’Regan et al 2005). A more precise definition, developed by the
Australian National Audit Office (ANAO) which has been adopted by the Department of
Prime Minister and Cabinet (PM&C) for Commonwealth Public Sector Annual Reports,
states that “corporate governance refers to the processes by which organisations are
directed, controlled and held to account. It encompasses authority, accountability,
stewardship, leadership, direction and control exercised in the organisation. (ANAO,
2003a, p.6) This definition of public sector corporate governance is supported by Uhrig
in his 2003 report on corporate governance of Statutory Authorities by explaining it is
concerned with “the power of those in control of the strategy and direction of an entity
…… taking into account risk and the environment in which it is operating.” (2003, p.2)

Public sector corporate governance structures are generally considered to no different
than the corporate governance structures in the private sector. This belief has led to a
significant push, over the past decade, for the public sector to adopt private sector
corporate governance processes and structures (Edwards 2002, p.52).
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One of the key processes required to be undertaken to develop an effective corporate
governance structure of on organisation is the clarification of appropriate roles for
management and for the board of directors (ASX 2003, p.3). However, while the roles
and powers of directors on public sector boards appear similar to those of directors on
private sector boards there are significant fundamental differences. The most significant
difference is in relation to the level of power of directors “a key characteristic of a board
in a public company is its full power to act and its responsibility to do so. This includes
the approval of strategy and direction for the business and important company policies, as
well as overseeing the performance of management”. (Uhrig 2003, p.4) However a board
in the public sector has limited power due, primarily to the fact government organisations
are created for the implementation of established policy and the delivery of intended
outcomes based on government policies. (Uhrig 2003, p.31) The real power in a public
sector organisation rests not with the board of directors but with the responsible Minister
as he or she controls the appointment of board members and can therefore influence the
behaviour of board members and reduce the autonomy of boards. (Howard and SethPurdie, 2005 p.60) The Minister is provided by legislation certain powers over the
organisation that can significantly impact on the level of autonomy of public sector
boards. For example under sections 28 and 43 of the Commonwealth Authorities and
Corporations Act 1997 (CAC Act) the Minister has the power to provide, after
consultation with the board, written notification to the board about general government
policy which the board is obliged to ensure is carried out. (ANAO 2003b, p.3) The
Minister also has the authority to appoint, long with other board members, the CEO or
Managing Director. The former Deputy Secretary of the Department of Finance and
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Administration (DoFA) Professor Steven Bartos explains that “the power to appoint or
remove CEOs is one of the most prized powers of government.” (Bartos 2005, p.96) It is
also worth considering when examining the effectiveness and independence of a public
sector board that the minister also has the “the power of the purse, through portfolio
budget allocations”. (Howard and Seth-Purdie, 2005 p59)

Regardless of the level of power and autonomy of public sector boards they still need to
ensure the corporate governance structures of their organisations allows them to
effectively meet their responsibilities to their key stakeholders. To assist the Australian
National Audit Office (ANAO) has developed comprehensive Better Practice Guides, for
use amongst the public sector, that outlines quite explicitly the frameworks, processes
and practices government organisations should take to ensure their corporate government
arrangements meet the expectations of their key stakeholders to effectively discharge
their accountabilities. There is also a number of pieces of specific legislation developed
for Commonwealth Government entities which prescribe the required processes and
functions that affect the governance of these entities. The main pieces of legislation
include the Auditor-General Act 1997, the Public Service Act 1999 (PS Act), the
Financial Management and Accountability Act 1997 (FMA Act), the Commonwealth
Authorities and Companies Act 1997 (CAC Act) and the Corporations Act 2001. (ANAO
2003 a, p.10)

Background: Commonwealth Authorities and Companies Act 1997 (CAC Act)
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The Commonwealth Authorities and Companies Act 1997 (CAC Act) was developed to
regulate the financial reporting and accountability of Commonwealth Statutory
Authorities and Commonwealth Companies. Commonwealth Statutory Authorities are
body corporates, that hold money on their own account, incorporated for a public purpose
by Act or by regulations under an Act. (CAC Act ss.7) Commonwealth Companies are
Corporations Act 2001 companies in which the Commonwealth has a controlling interest (ss 34).
The CAC Act “has reporting requirements and other requirements that apply in addition to

the requirements of the Corporations Act 2001”. (CAC Act page 1)

The creation of Commonwealth Statutory Authorities and Commonwealth Companies is
based on various decisions made by government where it is considered more appropriate
for government controlled entities to operate “outside a traditional departmental
structure” (Uhrig 2003 p.16) To ensure these detached organisations operate effectively
and in line with government expectations the majority of Commonwealth Statutory
Authorities have a governing body such as a council or board where the members of the
governing body are defined as directors. (CAC Act, ss 5). The role of directors, who are
selected and appointed by the responsible Minister, of Statutory Authorities which are
Commonwealth authorities for CAC Act 1997 purposes is rather more complex than
those for public corporations. They are subject to similar requirements as specified for
directors of public companies in the Corporations Act 2001. For example Section 27E of
the CAC Act 1997 states:
If the directors of a Commonwealth authority delegate a power under its enabling
legislation, a director is responsible for the exercise of the power by the delegate
as if the power had been exercised by the directors themselves.
6

which is comparable to section 198D of the Corporations Act 2001:
The directors of a company may delegate any of their powers ….. the exercise of
the power by the delegate is as effective as if the directors had exercised it.
However there are also additional requirements directors of Statutory Authorities outlined
in the CAC Act 1997.

The directors of a CAC Act 1997 statutory authority in addition to preparing an annual
report, which is eventually tabled in Parliament, and forwarding the completed annual
report to the responsible Minister (CAC Act 1997, ss.9) the directors are also required to
prepare budget estimates for each financial year. (ss.14) The budget estimates are
estimates of the proposed annual expenditure of the statutory authority and they are
referred, via the Government to one of the Senate’s legislation committees for
examination and report. These legislation committees consist of six senators, three from
the government (one of whom is the committee chair), two from the opposition, and one
representing the minority parties or independents (Senate, Brief 5). Harry Evans (2004),
Clerk of the Senate, explains that the legislation committees’ scrutiny of the estimates
provides an opportunity for the Senate to assess the performance of the public service and
its administration of government policy and programs. The review of the budget
estimates is one of the most important accountability functions of the Parliament and
therefore the directors must not fail to provide the responsible Minister with the Budget
Estimates by the required deadline.
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Sections 16 and 17 of the CAC Act 1997 outline the additional requirements of directors
of a statutory authority including they must inform the Minister of the operations of the
authority and provide the minister and the Finance Minister reports, documents and
information as the Ministers’ require (ss.16) and they must also, each year, prepare a
corporate plan which includes the objectives of the authority , business assumptions
based on the organisation’s operating environment as well as the organisation’s price and
quality control strategies and community service obligations. (ss.17)

Like directors of public companies the directors of statutory authorities are legally
required to ensure the financial statements of the organisation are audited by an
appropriately qualified auditor. However the directors of the statutory don’t have a
choice of auditor, rather
… the directors of a Commonwealth authority must do whatever is necessary to
ensure that all relevant subsidiary’s financial statements are audited by the
Auditor-General. (section 12, (1))
To support this requirement the CACAct1997 (ss.12.3) states the Auditor-General must
give the report to the responsible Minister(section 12, (3))

Empirical Tests

There are 71 statutory authorities which are Commonwealth Authorities for CAC Act
purposes – as at 4 December 2006 – of which 25 are defined as material entities as they
comprise 99% of revenues, expenses, assets and liabilities (DoFA . ) From the 25
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material Commonwealth Statutory Authorities 19 were selected for this review. The
Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC) was excluded as it operates
under the Financial Management and Accountability Act 1997 (FMA Act), while the
Australian Government Solicitor, Comcare, and the Civil Aviation Authority were
excluded as they have a single person at the apex of the body rather than a multi-member
board. (DoFA ). The Australian Industry Development Corporation and Coal Mining
Industry (Long Service Leave Funding) Corporation were also excluded.

The 19 Statutory Authorities in the review had a total on 176 directors which equates to
an average number of over 9 directors per Statutory Authority board which is consistent
with the findings of the Higg’s 2003 report “the board should be of sufficient size that
the balance of skills and experience is appropriate for the requirement of the business”
(p.22). One of the better practice recommendations of the Uhrig report (2003) is “the
board size should be developed taking into consideration factors such as an entity’s size,
complexity, risk of operations and the needs of the board”. The ASX Corporate
Governance Principle 2 summarises that the size of the board should be conducive to
encourage expedient and efficient decision making. (2003, p.22) These three reports
indicate that it is not necessary to prescribe a definite board size but rather a decision
based on individual organizational needs is advised. The other important
recommendation of these reports is that the majority of directors should be non-executive
directors. The justification for this recommendation is that the greater the number of nonexecutive directors the greater the level of independence the directors.
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The 2005 -06 Annual Report for each of the 19 Statutory Authorities was used to collect
the following information:
•

Number of directors

•

Mix of executive and non-executive directors

•

Gender of directors

•

Average length of service of directors

•

Highest level of qualification of directors

•

Remuneration of non-executive directors

•

Number of other directorships

The results from this review are presented in the following section

Results
Of the 176 directors 161 (91%) could be classified as non-executive directors (NED),
however of these 161 directors 23 are also current senior public servants and are
considered to be non-independent non-executive directors (Non Ind). These nonindependent non-executive directors include senior departmental officers as well as
current members of parliament. They are primarily on the board to represent the interests
of the major stakeholders of the Statutory Authority, the Commonwealth Government
and Parliament. For example Senator George Bandis (member of the Government) and
Martin Ferguson MP (member of the Opposition) are both on the board of the National
Library and their presence would be to ensure the interests of Parliament are represented.
An example of a current senior public servant having a representational position on the
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board of a Statutory Authority is Ms Lisa Paul, Secretary of Department of Science,
Education and Training (DEST). Ms Paul is also a director on the board of the
Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research Organisation (CSIRO) which also
happens to be a Statutory Authority within her –DEST’s – portfolio. This high level of
non-independent directors was criticised in the Uhrig report because representational
appointments have the potential to place the success of the entity at risk.(2003, p.13)
Howard and Seth-Purdie support this criticism by commenting “having the portfolio
secretary as an ex-officio member of the board, regardless of whether the position carries
voting rights, is a further complication, particularly when financial matters are at stake.”
(Howard and Seth-Purdie, 2005 p56-57)

Take in table 1
The results from table 1 are consistent with the recommendations of the Higg’s report “at
least half of the members of the board, excluding the chairman, should be independent
non-executive directors” (2003, p.35) and the ASX Essential Corporate Governance
Principles “a majority of the board should be independent directors”. (2003, p.19)

Table 2 reports the gender mix of non-executive directors and executive directors. The
portion of female non-executive directors (29%) is significantly higher than comparable
studies of non-executive directors in the private sector. Li and Wearing’s (2004) study
reported female non-executive directors only made 6% of non-executive directors in the
top 350 UK listed companies. Pass (2004) reported a slightly higher portion of female
non-executive directors in large UK companies (11%) while Cortese and Bowrey’s
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(2007) study of the top 50 Australian listed companies (ASX 50) found 16% of nonexecutive directors were female.

Take in table 2
Even more significant than the larger proportion of female non-executive directors is the
fact that all statutory authority boards in the study had one or more female non-executive
directors. This is significant when comparing to Pass’s (2004) study which showed only
58 percent of UK companies had one or more female board members while the Cortese
and Bowrey (2007) study indicated only 83% had one or more female board members.

The qualifications of 113 directors could be determined from the various Statutory
Authorities annual reports (64% of the sample). Table 3 shows the split of the highest
level of formal qualifications these 113 directors have attained.

Take in table 3

It is apparent from the data most directors have some level of tertiary qualifications. Of
the directors with post graduate qualifications a significant proportion 19 (25%) have
been awarded PhDs with remainder holders of Masters degrees and or professional
qualifications such as CPA Australia status.
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The length of service of non-executive directors has also been identified as a possible key
indicator of board performance and level of independence. The ASX listing rules suggest
non-executive directors should serve on a board only for a period time where it would not
interfere with the director’s ability to act in the best interests of the company. (ASX,
2003, p.20). This view is reflected in Uhrig’s (2003) report where it was suggested a
maximum board service period be set so as to allow for appropriate rotation of directors.
Higg’s came to the conclusion that non-executive directors could appropriately serve two
three-year terms with a company however it would be questionable the value for a nonexecutive director serving longer. (2003, p.53)

Take in table 4
Table 4 shows the average length of service of non-executive directors in the sample
Statutory Authorities to be 4.5 years which is similar to the findings of the comparable
study of ASX50 corporations (Cortese and Bowrey 2007). There is some concern with
approximately 8% of non-executive directors in the sample being members of their
respective boards for 10 or more years. This length of service could present problems,
particularly in relation to the independence of non-executive directors, “the substantial
length of time served by some non-executive directors could reasonably be perceived to
interfere with the independence of these board members” (ASX, 2003, p.20)

The most obvious difference between non-executive directors of Commonwealth
Statutory Authorities and private sector companies is the level of remuneration for nonexecutive directors. Cortese and Bowrey (2007) found that the majority of the ASX50
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companies provided their non-executive directors with average remuneration in excess of
$140,000. Table 5 shows the majority (68%) of non-executive directors in the sample
received remuneration between $15,000 and $45,000 per year with the average level of
remuneration $32,000.

Take in table 5

Excluded from the above table is the average level of remuneration for the non-executive
directors of the Reserve Bank of Australia (RBA) board. This is because the RBA’s
2005-06 Annual Report only discloses in the financial notes (Note 12, p.85) the
consolidated remuneration of Key Management Personnel which includes the Governor
and Deputy Governor, 8 non-executive RBA Board members, 5 non-executive Payments
System Board members and 5 senior staff. Even though the RBA is a Statutory Authority
operating under the CAC Act 1997 it is surprising it was not possible to identify
separately the remuneration of board members. The ASX Essential Corporate
Governance Principle 9 (ASX 2003) requires the disclosure of non-executive directors’
remuneration to be clear and adequately distinguished from the remuneration structure
applied to company executives.

Also not included in the above table is the remuneration of non-independent nonexecutive directors, senior public servants and members of parliament, as they do not
receive any remuneration for their directorships on Statutory Authorities boards. This is
generally made clear in the notes to the financial statements, for example in the National
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Library of Australia 2005-06 Annual Report Note 13 (page 115) states “Parliamentary
members of Council do not receive any remuneration from the Library for their service
on Council”

The data collected shows 84 directors of Statutory Authorities (48% of the sample) held
at least one other directorship.

Take in table 6

However, of all the directors in the sample only five hold at least one other directorship
with another Statutory Authority. Two of which are non-independent non-executive
directors, Mark Paterson Secretary of the Department of Industry, Tourism and Resources
(DITR) and Helen Williams Secretary of Secretary Department of Communications,
Information Technology and the Arts (DCITA). This tends to indicate the non-executive
directors of Commonwealth Statutory Authorities are able to contribute a significant
amount of private sector corporate experience to their roles on the boards of Statutory
Authorities. However, whilst on the surface private sector experience would be
invaluable to the boards of Statutory Authorities Howard and Seth-Purdy (2005) found,
through their interviews of non-executive directors, a number of non-executive directors
initially struggled adapting to the processes and functions of public sector organisations.

Summary and conclusion
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The boards of directors of Commonwealth Statutory Authorities are unique in a number
of different ways when compared to the boards of the public companies. On the surface
they appear similar, for example they are similar in size and composition, but scratch
away at the surface and a range of different characteristics and requirements become
apparent. In public companies there is a definite drive to increase the proportion of nonexecutive directors in the hope the level of independence of the board from the
management of the organisation is improved. However, independence does not appear to
be a characteristic required nor encouraged for directors of Statutory Authorities. The
findings from this small study indicate the proportion of non-executive directors is
comparable if not higher than public corporation boards, but the fact the Minister selects
and appoints (or recommends for appointment) negates the superficial independence of
these non-executive directors.

Besides executive and non-executive directors some boards of Commonwealth Statutory
Authorities also include non-independent non-executive directors who are literally
representational directors. These directors are either senior public servants or members
of parliament. Their role is to represent the government or parliament and protect their
interests, rather than participate for the benefit of the Statutory Authority. For example
Ms Helen Williams who is the Secretary of the Department of Communications,
Information Technology and the Arts (DCITA) sits on the boards of National Library of

16

Australia and the Australian Sports Commission. Both of these Statutory Authorities
come under the umbrella of her portfolio department (DCITA). This presents an
interesting position, for not only does Ms Williams sit on the board and assist in
preparing and signing-off the Annual Reports and Budget Estimates of these two
Statutory Authorities, she also has the role of Secretary of DCITA with responsibilities
which include considering funding requests from these statutory authorities. Howard and
Seth-Purdie summarise this interesting position as “a secretary would be simultaneously
policy advisor to the minister, major client of the authority and authority board member”.
(2005, p.62) The situation complements the independence paradox created by the need of
independent directors, in the course of fulfilling their responsibilities, to rely heavily on
the information provided by the same executives from whom they are to said to be
independent Hooghiemstra and van Manen (2004).

The other glaring conflict within the current public sector governance structure is the due
to the power of the responsible Minister over the Commonwealth Statutory Authority.
As outlined above, the Minister appoints board members, can direct the board to comply
with general government policies (ss.28 of the CAC Act) as well as determine the overall
strategy of the authority (Uhrig 2003, p.35). Where is the independence and autonomy of
the board? Uhrig commented that the power to act is essential to a board’s ability to
govern effectively (2003, p.23) however due to the powers of the responsible Minister it
appears the boards of Statutory Authorities are not able to govern effectively as they do
not have the power to act with autonomy.
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Appendix 1: Statutory Authorities included in the analysis
Statutory Authority
Grains Research and Development Corporation

Portfolio
Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry

Australian Broadcasting Corporation (ABC)

Communications, Information
Technology and the Arts

Australian Postal Corporation

Communications, Information
Technology and the Arts

Australian Sports Commission

Communications, Information
Technology and the Arts

National Gallery of Australia

Communications, Information
Technology and the Arts

National Library of Australia

Communications, Information
Technology and the Arts

National Museum of Australia

Communications, Information
Technology and the Arts

Special Broadcasting Service Corporation (SBS)

Communications, Information
Technology and the Arts

Defence Housing Australia (DHA)

Defence

Australian Nuclear Science and Technology

Education, Science and Training

Organisation (ANSTO)
Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial

Education, Science and Training

Research Organisation (CSIRO)
Indigenous Business Australia

Employment and Workplace Relations

Export Finance and Insurance Corporation

Foreign Affairs and Trade

Australian Hearing Services

Human Services

Tourism Australia

Industry, Tourism and Resources

Australian Reinsurance Pool Corporation

Treasury

Reserve Bank of Australia

Treasury

Australian War Memorial

Veteran’s Affairs

Airservices Australia

Transport and Regional Services
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Appendix 2
The Uhrig Report 2003 - Summary of Better Practice Guidance for Boards
1. Board size should be developed taking into consideration factors such as an
entity’s size, complexity, risk of operations and the needs of the board.

2. Committees are a useful mechanism for the board to enhance its effectiveness
through further detailed oversight and supervision of the management of risks that
are critical to the success of the entity. Committees should be used only for this
purpose.

3. In getting the best from boards, appropriately experienced directors are critical to
good governance.

4. Representational appointments to boards have the potential to place the success of
the entity at risk.

5. Responsible Ministers should issue appointment letters detailing government
expectations of directors.

6. Maximum board service periods allow for a structured rotation of directors.

7. All boards should have orientation programs and directors should have the
opportunity for ongoing professional development.

8. Annual assessments of the board need to occur to ensure government gets the best
from the board.
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Tables
Table 1

Mix of Directors

Non Ind
13%

NED
78%

ED
9%

Table 2
Gender Proportion of NED Directors

Female
29%
Male
71%

Gender Proportion of ED Directors

Male
87%
Female
13%
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Table 3

Qualifications
Dip
4%
PG
66%
G
30%

Table 4
# of
Directors

Length of Board Membership

35
30
25
20
15
10
5
0
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

Other

Years
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Table 5
#

Number of NED's within specific remuneration ranges

60
50
40
30
20
10
0

1 - 15

15 - 30
30 - 45
Remuneration Range ($000's)

45 - 60

60 -75

Table 6
# of
Directors
30

Number of other
Directorships held

25
20
15
10
5
0
1

2

3

4
Directorships

5

6

7
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